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I. INTRODUCTION
The judiciary and Congress have long grappled with the proper
interpretation of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution. They have
also struggled to interpret and redraft copyright laws to keep up with a
world where the mediums of creative expression are ever evolving.
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Riding on the crest of this perpetual conundrum is the management of the
idea-expression divide that exists at the heart of every copyright
protection analysis. Underpinning the idea-expression divide lay the
doctrines of merger and scènes à faire (“the doctrines”): both simple in
theory yet elusive in practice. The merger doctrine states that where an
idea is inseparably connected to a particular expression, the idea and the
expression are said to have “merged” with one another.1 Such connection
between idea and expression is not protected under copyright law,
because it would contravene the notion of original expression protection
by unfairly granting a monopoly to the author and banning all others
from expressing the idea.2 Similarly, the scènes à faire doctrine bars
standard phrases that necessarily flow from a common setting or theme
from copyright protection.3
As a testimony to the cumbersome nature of copyright analysis, a
circuit split has perpetuated for decades regarding proper application of
the two doctrines in the copyright infringement context. In a copyright
infringement case, the plaintiff must prove two things: (1) the existence
of a valid copyright and (2) that the defendant actually copied the work.4
When merger and scènes à faire are introduced, the courts have
inconsistently applied the doctrines in their analyses. With regard to the
merger doctrine, it has been held by the Second and Ninth Circuits, on
the one hand, that the merger doctrine should only operate as a defense to
copyright infringement.5 On the other hand, it has been held by the Fifth,
Sixth, and Ninth Circuits that merger determines copyrightability.6 A
similar rift exists regarding the application of the scènes à faire doctrine.
The Seventh and Ninth Circuits have taken the stance that scènes à faire
is separate from the doctrine regarding the validity of copyright7 while
the Second and Sixth Circuits have applied scènes à faire to a
determination of copyrightability.8
1
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
13.03[B][3][b] (Matthew Bender & Co. 2006).
2
Id.
3
Id. § 13.03[B][4].
4
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 534-36 (6th
Cir. 2004).
5
Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Kregos v.
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
6
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 535; Mason v. Montgomery Data, 967 F.2d 135, 138 (5th
Cir. 1992); see Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1475-76 (9th
Cir. 1992).
7
Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909,
914 (7th Cir. 1996).
8
Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2004); Hoehling v.
Universal Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Although it has been asserted that no difference in outcome arises
from either approach,9 the enactment of the groundbreaking Digital
Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”) and recent case law demand a
new look at the consequences of the two approaches. The DMCA grants
additional legal protection to owners of copyrights who utilize
technology as a means to safeguard their works in digital form10 by
proscribing the anticircumvention of such protection measures.11
Potential liability is triggered for even an attempt at accessing a
copyrighted work that sits behind a technological protection measure,
whether successful or not. This right to access, or “paracopyright,” as it
is commonly known, has been the source of much controversy among
legal theorists and practitioners as it has greatly expanded the rights
bestowed upon a copyright owner.12
This comment attempts to provide a circumspect analysis of the
merger and scènes à faire doctrines as well as their application to the
modern digital world. It further attempts to show that, in light of the
harsh liability under the DMCA that is triggered by the circumvention of
technological protection measures, courts should be more reluctant to
permit copyright in marginal cases. Pre-DMCA case law demonstrates
that a majority of circuits follow this approach. Those circuits consider
this approach to support the constitutional goal of fostering creative
expression. A second rationale is that this approach supports the policy
of § 102(b) to protect ideas from ownership so as to avoid unfair
monopolies. Finally, this comment shows that failure to apply the
doctrines as bars to copyrightability will yield false positives, the effect
of which stands in direct contrast to the constitutional goal of fostering
creative expression. In light of these arguments, the courts must employ
greater prudence when they consider which approach to take. This
comment does not assert that the doctrines should be removed from the
affirmative defense prong of an infringement suit entirely, but rather that
the doctrines should be applied first at the copyrightability stage,
particularly in future DMCA cases.
9

See Scott Abrahamson, Comment, Seen One, Seen Them All? Making Sense of the
Copyright Merger Doctrine, 45 UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1164 (1998). In either case, the
Abrahamson comment notes that the practical outcome remains the same. It is
respectfully noted that this law review article was published the same year that the
DMCA was enacted. It would have been impossible for the author to consider the
implications created by the DMCA.
10
JULIE E. COHEN ET AL., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL INFORMATION ECONOMY 573, 578
(Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., Asben Law & Bus. 2002).
11
17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
12
For example, see Copyfight, http://copyfight.corante.com, which lists copious
articles written by legal practitioners and other highly respected thinkers on the
consequences of the DMCA and other copyright issues.
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II. THE IDEA-EXPRESSION DICHOTOMY AND THE MERGER AND SCÈNES À
FAIRE DOCTRINES
To fully understand the arguments proposed in this comment, it is
critical to first develop the idea-expression dichotomy and the related
doctrines of merger and scènes à faire. This section provides that
foundation by setting forth several core policies underlying copyright
law. The section then discusses how the courts have struggled to evaluate
ideas and expressions in an attempt to support these policies and, in
doing so, have utilized the doctrines of merger and scènes à faire as a
tool to aid them in their analyses.
The Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”13 While the Framers of the Constitution left much
unclear by this statement, it suggests a goal to enhance public welfare by
promoting the creation and dissemination of knowledge.14 The copyright,
which secures for a limited time an ownership right over a creative work,
serves as an economic incentive in furtherance of this goal.15 In direct
opposition to the constitutional goal of copyright law, the dissemination
of knowledge would be compromised if an author were allowed to have a
monopoly over an idea.16 It is a long-standing principle that copyright
protection extends to the expression and not to the idea. This principle
stems from the notion that “ideas are free to the world”17 and that the
protection of an idea would create an unfair monopoly on the part of the
owner of the copyrighted work. Congress codified this notion in § 102(b)
of the 1976 Copyright Act, which states that “in no case does copyright
protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea,
procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or
discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained,
illustrated, or embodied in such work.”18 This tenet of copyright law
begets the very dilemma with which courts grapple in copyright

13

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
CRAIG JOYCE, ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 19 (6th ed. 2003).
15
17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2006).
16
See, e.g., Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991)
(“[C]opyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encourages others
to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work. It is the means by
which copyright advances the progress of science and art.” (citation omitted)).
17
Taylor v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 115 F. Supp. 156, 157 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
18
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
14
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infringement cases: how to properly separate the idea and the
expression.19
Separating idea from expression has long troubled the courts. In
1930, Judge Learned Hand summarily explained the impossibility of a
universally generalizable solution:
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of
patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and
more of the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more
than the most general statement of what the play is about, and at
times might consist only of its title; but there is a point in this
series of abstractions where they are no longer protected, since
otherwise the playwright could prevent the use of his “ideas,” to
which, apart from their expression, his property is never
extended. Nobody has ever been able to fix that boundary, and
nobody ever can.20

The well-known doctrines of merger and scènes à faire emerged from
the difficulty in managing the idea-expression dichotomy.
The merger doctrine states that, where an idea is inseparably
connected to a particular expression, the idea and the expression are said
to have “merged” with one another.21 This unity of idea and expression
arises when there is only one or very few ways of expressing the idea.22
Such connection between idea and expression would contravene the
notion of original expression protection and unfairly grant a monopoly to
the author banning others from expressing the idea.23 For example, one
can express a map with directions to a buried treasure in very few ways.
To prevent unfair copyright protection in these cases, the courts have
implemented the merger doctrine to protect free expression to all above
granting an express monopoly over a single idea.24
Although the merger doctrine was historically applied to cases
involving literature, maps, compilations, and the like, the invention of the
computer and the incorporation of computer software into copyrightable
subject matter added a new dimension to merger applications. With
19
This issue also relates to unfair monopolies. See Abrahamson, supra note 9 at 1125
(“Too much copyright protection may bestow a windfall upon the party alleging
infringement . . . and may exert a dampening effect on future efforts; yet too little
protection, or none at all, may deprive the creator of the reward incentive which would in
turn chill future creative efforts and perhaps result in market failure.”).
20
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930) (citation
omitted).
21
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[B][3][b].
22
E.g., Hart v. Dan Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1996).
23
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[B][3][b].
24
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[B][3].
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regard to computer software, the individual elements of the computer
program may be considered to have merged with the idea.25
Several important cases have developed this concept. In 1984, the
court in Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp. examined the
merger doctrine.26 The court noted that if the computer program at issue
can be written in other fashions and perform the same function then the
program is a copyrightable expression of an idea.27 The court stated that
“this inquiry is no different than that made to determine whether the
expression and idea have merged, which has been stated to occur where
there are no or few other ways of expressing a particular idea.”28 If the
idea merges with the expression, a copyright is unavailable.29 A more
sophisticated application of the doctrine was explored in Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc.,30 which held that “if the patentable
process is embodied inextricably in the line-by-line instructions of the
computer program . . . then the process merges with the expression and
precludes copyright protection.”31 In Brown Bag Software v. Symantec
Corp., the Ninth Circuit used a “functional demands” approach and held
that the portions of the computer program “essential to the idea of the
computer program were ideas and unprotected.”32 In Gates Rubber Co. v.
Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd., another court defined merger as
“expression that is inseparable from or merged with the ideas, processes,

25

Id.; see Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 839-40 (Fed.
Cir. 1992); see also Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522,
542 (6th Cir. 2004) (“What is clear is that the bytes containing the ‘LXK’ reference are
functional in the sense that they, like the rest of the Toner Loading Program, also serve as
input to the checksum operation and as a result amount to a lock-out code that the merger
and scènes à faire doctrines preclude from obtaining protection.”).
26
714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983). In this case, Apple challenged a denial of a motion
for preliminary injunction against Franklin Computer Corp. for copyright infringement of
fourteen of Apple’s computer programs including its operating system (other claims not
pertinent to this comment were also before the court). Id. at 1242. In the district court,
Franklin disputed the claim under the defense that Apple’s programs were not
copyrightable subject matter. Id. at 1244.
27
Id. at 1252.
28
Id. at 1253 (citing Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 678-79 (1st
Cir. 1967); Freedman v. Grolier Enters., Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)
(“Copyright protection will not be given to a form of expression necessarily dictated by
the underlying subject matter.”).
29
Apple, 714 F.2d at 1253.
30
975 F.2d 832, 839-40 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
31
Id.
32
960 F.2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992). In this case, Brown Bag Software sued
Symantec for copyright infringement of Brown Bag’s computer program, which was
protected under a registered copyright. Id. at 1468. The district court entered summary
judgment in favor of Symantec and Brown Bag appealed. Id.
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or discoveries underlying the expression.”33 The court noted that, in
applying merger and other limiting doctrines, the source code and object
code will constitute copyright-protected material in most cases whereas
the main purpose of a program never will.34
The doctrine of scènes à faire also limits copyright protection.
Literally, it translates to “‘scenes’ . . . ‘that must be done.’”35 In the
literary context, it bars phrases that are “standard, stock, . . . or that
necessarily follow from a common theme or setting” from copyright
protection.36 A classic example of a stock scene is the inclusion of a
criminal foot chase in a police fiction or the use of a tough-speaking
Italian mobster smoking a cigar in a Mafia movie.37 In Hoehling v.
Universal Studios, a case which considered the copyrightability of a
book on the voyages of the famed Hindenburg ship, the Second Circuit
declared that “[b]ecause it is virtually impossible to write about a
particular historical era or fictional theme without employing certain
‘stock’ or standard literary devices . . . scenes à faire are not
copyrightable as a matter of law.”38 Although scènes à faire would
appear at first glance to be limited to cases involving movies, plays, and
other artistic media, it extends to the computer software context as well.
Scènes à faire is applied to the elements of a computer program that
are dictated by the requirements of the system as a whole such as
“hardware standards and mechanical specifications, software standards
and compatibility requirements, computer manufacturer design
standards, target industry practices and demands, and computer industry
programming practices.”39 A major goal of computer software and
systems, in general, is efficiency. From a utilitarian perspective, the more
efficient a program is, the less memory it will require from a computer
and, therefore, the more marketable it will be. A second major goal of
computer software is interoperability. Interoperability is a computer
program’s ability to function properly with other software or even
hardware components. For instance, a computer’s operating system,
33
9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993). In this case, Bando Chemical hired away
numerous Gates employees to help create a computer program, similar to one created by
Gates, that performed complex calculations for rubber belt manufacturing. Id. at 830-31.
Gates sued Bando for copyright infringement and the lower court entered a decision
against them. Id. at 830. Bando appealed the decision as well as other claims not pertinent
to this comment. Id.
34
Id. at 836.
35
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 535 (6th Cir.
2004).
36
Id. (quoting Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 838).
37
See, e.g., Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44, 50 (2d Cir. 1986).
38
618 F.2d 972, 979 (2d Cir. 1980).
39
Gates Rubber, 9 F.3d at 838 (citations omitted).
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whether Microsoft XP or Mac OS, must be able to operate with the
various software applications it calls upon, whether Microsoft-made or
not, as well as the various hardware components that make up the
computer system. The drive for greater efficiency and interoperability
severely limits the options available to computer programmers in
expressing the function of the software. These external constraints, thus,
figure prominently into the copyrightability of computer programs40 and
frequently lead to a denial of copyright protection where it would
otherwise seem warranted.
From the foundation laid out in this section, the reader can navigate
through the cases discussed in the next section. Those cases span decades
of judicial decision making and cover an array of tangible mediums from
literature to computer technology. The following section will also
illustrate the two strains of legal thinking regarding the proper
application of the doctrines in the copyright infringement context.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The merger and scènes à faire doctrines are difficult to apply,
largely due to the fact that the doctrines do not instruct courts on how to
identify which aspects of a copyrighted work are ineligible for copyright
protection nor what the scope of protection should be.41 The cumbersome
nature of the doctrines naturally results in varying copyright
infringement analyses. In a copyright infringement case, the plaintiff
must prove two things: (1) the existence of a valid copyright and (2) that
the defendant actually copied the work.42 With regard to the merger
doctrine, on the one hand, some circuits hold that the merger doctrine
should only operate as a defense to copyright infringement.43 Other
circuits hold that merger determines copyrightability.44 A similar rift
exists regarding the application of the scènes à faire doctrine. Some
circuits take the stance that scènes à faire is separate from the doctrine

40
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 536 (citing Computer Assoc. Int’l v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693, 708 (2d Cir. 1992)).
41
Id.; JOYCE, supra note 14, at 166; accord Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir. 1983).
42
Lexmark, 387 F.3d at 534-36.
43
Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 1068, 1082 (9th Cir. 2000); Kregos v.
Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir. 1991).
44
Lexmark, 387 F.3d 522; Mason v. Montgomery Data, Inc., 967 F.2d 135 (5th Cir.
1992); Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1478 (9th Cir. 1992).
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regarding the validity of copyright45 while others consider scènes à faire
to be a determination of copyrightability.46
The following sections explain the two competing approaches to
the application of the merger and scènes à faire doctrines in the
copyright infringement context. These sections also support the
application of the doctrines as bars to copyrightability. This approach
serves the goals of § 102(b) of the Copyright Act and promotes
competition among businesses. The judicially created tests, which
separate idea from expression in the computer software context, also
support the application of the doctrines as bars to copyrightability.
Ultimately, viewing the split in relation to the groundbreaking and
controversial Digital Millennium Copyright Act solidifies support for the
bar to copyrightability approach in Part IV.A.
A. The Doctrines Applied as Bars to Copyrightability
Circuits that apply the doctrines as bars to copyrightability
commonly find that using the merger and scènes à faire doctrines in this
manner falls in accord with § 102(b) of the Copyright Act, which
mandates that “[i]n no case does copyright protection for an original
work of authorship extend to any idea . . . [or] procedure . . . regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such work.”47 The merger doctrine states that, where an idea is
inseparably connected to a particular expression, the idea and the
expression are said to have “merged” with one another, such that the
expression becomes the idea and, thus, not protectable under copyright
law.48 Similarly, scènes à faire are phrases that are “standard, stock, . . .
or that necessarily follow from a common theme or setting;”49 they are,
therefore, barred from copyright protection under the same principle. The
idea/expression dichotomy is an embodiment of the constitutional goal
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”50 which, as a
policy matter, fosters creativity within the public by protecting it from
unfair monopolies.
When merger is applied as a bar to copyrightability, it serves the
constitutional goal of “promot[ing] the Progress of Science and the

45

Ets-Hokin, 225 F.3d at 1082; Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., 77 F.3d 909,
914 (7th Cir. 1996).
46
Stromback v. New Line Cinema, 384 F.3d 283 (6th Cir. 2004); Hoehling v.
Universal Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1980).
47
17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006).
48
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1.
49
Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 9 F.3d 823, 838 (10th Cir. 1993).
50
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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useful Arts.”51 In Veeck v. Southern Building Code Congress
International, Inc.,52 the court focused, in part, on this paradigm in its
determination that merger should be applied at the copyright stage.
Noting that the primary goal of the Constitution was not to reward the
author for her labor but rather to promote art and science, the Fifth
Circuit held that copyright not only secures an author’s right in her
creative work, but encourages others to freely build on the ideas
expounded in those works- a principle that “‘applies to all works of
authorship.’”53 Merger, therefore, secures that which is actually an idea
for the public to utilize in creating other works. Quoting the Supreme
Court, the Fifth Circuit noted that the § 102(b) “‘idea[-]expression
dichotomy strikes a definitional balance between the First Amendment
and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of facts while
still protecting an author’s expression.’”54
In Veeck, the defendant argued that the idea-expression dichotomy
was enacted as a policy matter to “‘balance[] the competing concerns of
providing incentive to authors to create and foster[] competition in such
creativity.’”55 The defendant argued that merger would not bar
copyrightability of its model building codes but rather would apply only
if a subsequent author wishing to create a code would need to use the
identical expression to convey the idea.56 The court reasoned that “[t]his
argument effectively converts the merger doctrine from a limit on
copyrightability into a mere defense against infringement based on the
identity of the author.”57 The court held that § 102(b) fosters creativity
not as a defense to infringement claims but rather by permitting the
effluence of information in ideas and facts from their emergence.58 This
goal of fostering creativity supports the rejection of merger as a defense
against particular types of infringement, because the defense approach
misinterprets the balance under § 102(b).
51

Id.
293 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 2002). In this case, Veeck published model building codes
created by the Southern Building Code Congress International (“SBCCI”) on his website.
Id. SBCCI’s codes were not enacted into positive law. Id. At the time of the case, the
codes did not necessarily fall outside of copyright protection. Id. Thus, SBCCI sued
Veeck for copyright infringement to which Veeck asserted merger as a defense. Id.
53
Id. at 800 (quoting Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991)).
54
Id. at 801 (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539,
556 (1985)).
55
Id. (quoting Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d 1458,
1463 (5th Cir. 1990)).
56
Id.
57
Id. at 801-02.
58
Id. at 802.
52
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Due to their inherent functional nature, computer programs pose a
bigger problem in the analysis of the idea-expression dichotomy and
demonstrate a greater need for the application of the doctrines as bars to
copyrightability. Although the source code and the object code of a
computer program may warrant copyright protection, to the extent
compatibility or efficiency requires that a specific code sequence be
included with a component device to permit its operation, the doctrines
generally keep the code from obtaining copyright protection.59 As the
Ninth Circuit noted in Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., “[w]hen
specific instructions, even though previously copyrighted, are the only
and essential means of accomplishing a given task, their later use by
another will not amount to infringement.”60
This holding is consistent with the First Circuit’s decision in Lotus
Development Corp. v. Borland International, Inc., which involved the
copying of a computer menu command hierarchy.61 The court did not
concern itself with an analysis of infringement, but stated that the initial
inquiry should be whether the menu hierarchy could be copyrighted at
all.62 Regarding the “long prompts” (the bottom line display) component
of the menu, the court did not take a stance on whether it was
copyrightable, but noted that a strong argument could be made that
merger prevented the prompts from being copyrighted.63 The court also
discussed the menu command hierarchy as a method of operation. The
First Circuit stated that the expressions of the menu are immaterial to a
method of operation. While not explicitly discussing merger, the court
stated that “[i]f specific words are essential to operating something, then
they are part of a ‘method of operation’ and, as such, are
unprotectable.”64 This holding supports, in the computer context, the
barring of methods from copyright protection under § 102(b).
Application of the doctrines as bars to copyrightability also benefits
competition among businesses by eliminating monopoly power. In Kern
River Gas Transmission v. Coastal Corp., the Fifth Circuit considered a
copyright infringement case involving a topographical map upon which
59

2004).
60

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 536 (6th Cir.

977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final Report 20 (1979)); accord Atari Games
Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., Nos. 88-4805 & 89-0027, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6786,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. May 18, 1993) (“Program code that is strictly necessary to achieve
current compatibility presents a merger problem, almost by definition, and is thus
excluded from the scope of any copyright.”).
61
49 F.3d 807 (1st Cir. 1995).
62
Id. at 815.
63
Id. at 816.
64
Id.
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the plaintiff, a gas transmission company, superimposed lines and mile
markings for a natural gas pipeline development proposal.65 A competing
company utilized these maps with certain modifications in a proposal to
build its own pipeline.66 Plaintiff brought an action for copyright
infringement against defendant for use of its copyrighted map.67 The
court stated that where merger has occurred, a party is not barred from
copying the expression, because a grant of copyright protection in that
instance would unfairly grant a monopoly upon the idea.68 The court
specifically agreed with the district court and stated that the proposed
location of prospective pipelines is not copyrightable.69 If it were
copyrightable, Kern would monopolize the idea for the location of the
pipeline, which would foreclose competition in opposition to the
congressional intent behind copyright law.70 The court specifically
denied the defendant’s urging not to look at merger in terms of
copyrightability.71 Similarly, the Third Circuit in Whelan Associates, Inc.
v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., addressed the issue of copyright
infringement of a computer program structure.72 The court looked first at
the copyrightability of the plaintiff’s work before considering the
infringement analysis.73 The court also stated that scènes à faire, as a bar
to copyrightability, is a “well-settled doctrine”; holding otherwise would
unfairly grant a monopoly on ideas to the copyright owner.74
Two judicially-created tests, known as the abstraction-filtrationcomparison and the extrinsic-intrinsic test, separate idea from expression
in the computer software context and support the application of the
doctrines as bars to copyrightability. Before merger and scènes à faire
are applied in computer software cases, some courts must undergo the
abstraction-filtration-comparison. In Computer Assoc. International v.
Altai, Inc., the Second Circuit introduced the abstraction-filtrationcomparison concept to analyze copyright infringements in ascertaining
substantial similarity.75 The abstraction test, originally expounded by
65

899 F.2d 1458, 1460 (5th Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id. at 1461.
68
Id. at 1463 (citing Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 103 (1880)).
69
Id. at 1464-65.
70
Id. at 1463-64.
71
Id. at 1464.
72
797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986).
73
Id. at 1224.
74
Id. at 1236.
75
982 F.2d 693, 706-07 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Altai”). In this case, Computer Associates
marketed a job scheduling program (“ADAPTER”) that was designed for IBM
mainframes. Id. at 698. A particular component of the program acted as a translator
between the program and the IBM operating system. Id. at 699. Altai marketed its own
66
67
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Judge Learned Hand, requires the courts to first break down the program
into its basic structural parts.76 Courts must effectively reverse-engineer
the program to identify all of its abstraction levels. First, the court will
look at the purpose of the application; then zoom in to extract the
functions of the higher-level modules that enable the purpose of the
application to be reached; then zoom in further to obtain the lower-level
modules that enable the higher-level modules to work; and, ultimately,
all that remains are the individual lines of code.77 The filtration phase
requires the court to eliminate any abstraction level that is unprotected by
copyright law. The court must determine if each level is an idea or
dictated by efficiency constraints so as to be incidental to the idea;
required by other external factors; or extracted out of the public
domain.78 The limiting doctrines of merger and scènes à faire are then
applied to determine whether the remaining levels of abstraction are
protectable by copyright.79 Once all components have been sifted out
through the filtration analysis utilizing merger and scènes à faire, then
the substantial similarity inquiry entails determining whether any aspect
of the plaintiff’s program was copied by the defendant.80
This test was applied by the Eleventh Circuit in Bateman v.
Mneumonics, Inc., which also considered the proper applications of the
doctrines in a case concerning computer programs.81 The district court
utilized the abstraction-filtration-comparison test to determine whether
there was actionable similarity.82 On appeal, the court focused on the
filtration step, which is used to separate out protectable expression from
non-protectable expression.83 The defendants argued that both merger
and scènes à faire should be applied at this stage in literal copying
(word-for-word copying) analysis, whereas the court instructions stated
job scheduler (“ZEKE” later adapted to “OSCAR”). Id. at 700. An employee of Altai
recruited an employee of Computer Associates, who brought with him the code for
ADAPTER. Id. He aided Altai in creating OSCAR. Id. at 700. Computer Associates sued
Altai for copyright infringement of their ADAPTER program. Id. at 700.
76
Id. at 706.
77
Id. at 707.
78
Id. at 707-10.
79
Id. The court in Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chemical Industries, Ltd. labeled the
filtration step as the “process-expression” dichotomy. 9 F.3d 823, 836 (10th Cir. 1993).
80
Altai, 982 F.2d at 710.
81
79 F.3d 1532 (11th Cir. 1996). In this case, Bateman sued Mneumonics on several
counts of copyright infringement of copyrighted software applications and hardware
components. Id. at 1536. Bateman claimed that he licensed the programs to defendant but
later terminated the license. Id. at 1538. Mneumonic, Inc. then created software that was
interoperable with Bateman’s software. Id. at 1539. Bateman sued Mneumonics for
copyright infringement. Id. at 1540.
82
Id. at 1544.
83
Id.
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that filtration only played a part in non-literal copying (paraphrasing or
copying the essence of the work) analysis.84 The court took no direct
stance on this issue but focused on the failure of the district court to
consider the challenges to copyrightability such as scènes à faire and
merger.85 Undoubtedly referring to the scènes à faire doctrine, the court
noted that programs may be dictated by external factors including
industry demands and efficiency considerations and, if found true, should
be applied so as to refute copyright protection of the work.86 With regard
to the merger doctrine, the court explicitly stated that a work deemed
copyrightable may not warrant copyright protection because this doctrine
may render the work unoriginal.87 Accordingly, Bateman instructs that
the doctrines must come into play to determine the copyrightability issue.
In Brown Bag Software v. Symantec, the Ninth Circuit faced a
copyright infringement suit regarding a computer program for
outlining.88 The district court utilized the extrinsic-intrinsic test to
determine the substantial similarity of the two programs.89 The extrinsicintrinsic test normally requires the court to perform an “analytic
dissection” which is an objective analysis of the expressive elements of
the work (the extrinsic test) followed by an evaluation of the substantial
similarity in the expressions from the viewpoint of the ordinary
reasonable person (the intrinsic test).90 The Ninth Circuit noted that the
district court properly applied analytic dissection to five groups of
features of the programs, not to identify infringement or compare
similarities, but “for the purpose of defining the scope of plaintiff’s
copyright.”91 The court agreed with this approach and stated that
copyrightability applies to both the ownership element as well as the
copying element of the claim.92 One aspect of copyright ownership “is
the copyrightability of the subject matter.”93
Circuits that apply the doctrines as bars to copyrightability base
their approach primarily on § 102(b) policy grounds. As discussed,
application of the doctrines in this manner serves additional goals, such

84

Id.
Id. at 1545.
86
Id. at 1546 (noting that fair use acts as a defense only after a work meets the
standard for copyright protection).
87
Id. at 1547.
88
960 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1992).
89
Id. at 1475.
90
Id.
91
Id. at 1475-76.
92
Id. at 1475.
93
Id. at 1476.
85
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as promoting competition.94 The next section explains the application of
the doctrines as a defense to infringement and demonstrates several
shortcomings to this approach.
B. The Doctrines Applied as Defenses to Infringement
A second approach applies the doctrines solely to the defense prong
of the infringement claim and removes the doctrines’ application as bars
to copyrightability. This section explains the reasoning of courts that
follow this approach. In addition, this section discusses the view of a
well-recognized authority on copyright law. Finally, this section
introduces important considerations, which are not discussed by Nimmer
or the courts.
In Kregos v. Associated Press, the Second Circuit considered
whether a baseball pitching form was copyrightable.95 The court noted
94
It is also worth considering the copyright registration process. As previously
discussed, the first prong of a copyright infringement claim is ownership of a valid
copyright. Feist Publ’ns v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991). To satisfy this
prong, the plaintiff must prove that the work is original, which requires a showing of
proper adherence to statutory formalities. Id. at 361. The statutory formalities, under 17
U.S.C. § 411, demand that the copyright has been preregistered or registered. 17 U.S.C. §
411(a) (2006) (“[N]o action for infringement of the copyright in any United States work
shall be instituted until preregistration or registration of the copyright claim has been
made in accordance with this title.”). Unlike trademark registration or patent filing where
the application process is rigorous and heavily screened by the Patent and Trademark
Office, copyright registration is lax and registrations are issued with relatively low
scrutiny by the Copyright Office. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp.
364, 367 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). Therefore, the existence of a certificate of copyright
registration is simply prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the
defendant may rebut that presumption. Bibbero Sys., Inc. v. Colwell Sys., Inc., 893 F.2d
1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1990); see also Brown Bag Software v. Symantec, 960 F.2d 1465,
1474 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that the plaintiff’s copyright registration created a
presumption of validity that the defendant was entitled to rebut).
The merger and scènes à faire doctrines state that the expression of an idea may be
unoriginal due to the limited means of expressing the underlying idea. No reason supports
reserving the application of these doctrines to the substantial similarity side of the
analysis when they may be determinative from the outset. Not applying the doctrines at
this step would take away a defendant’s ability to rebut the presumption of validity. This
argument was offered in Kregos, in which Judge Sweet, in a dissenting opinion,
contended that the proper approach for the merger analysis requires the courts to decide
whether the copyrighted work meets the requirement of creativity and whether merger
exists before allowing copyright protection. Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700,
715 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J., dissenting). Judge Sweet interpreted the language of § 102
of the Copyright Act to indicate that copyright protection simply cannot be attributed to a
work, where the expression is inseparable from the underlying idea: “‘[i]n no case does
copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea . . . regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.’”
Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006)).
95
937 F.2d 700, 701 (2d Cir. 1991). The plaintiff distributed his pitching form to
newspapers, which displayed information about the past performances of opposing
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that assessing merger in the alleged infringement context rather than the
copyrightability context provides “a more detailed and realistic basis”
upon which a claim should be evaluated.96 The court offered no further
guidance than this statement of the circuit’s prior precedent under
Durham Industries, Inc. v. Tomy Corp.97 However, as Judge Sweet noted
in his dissent, the majority relied on precedent that did not reach the
question of merger at all.98 Judge Sweet argued that a proper merger
analysis requires the court to decide whether the copyrighted work meets
the requirement of creativity and whether merger exists before allowing
copyright protection.99
Nevertheless, in Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., the
Second Circuit solidified its position that the merger doctrine serves as a
defense to infringement.100 On appeal, the Second Circuit examined
whether the lower court applied the doctrine of merger prematurely as
part of the copyrightability inquiry.101 The court determined that the
lower court applied the doctrine prematurely on the grounds that
descriptions of the defendant’s work were not available; therefore, no
basis for evaluating the idea-expression divide existed.102 In general, the
court reasoned that only when all contested forms of expression are
pitchers scheduled to start the baseball game each day. Id. at 702. The form contained
several categories of data arranged in a particular format. Id. at 702-03. Some, but not all,
of the categories of data had been utilized in other publications in the past. Id. The
plaintiff successfully registered his pitching form with the Copyright Office. Id. at 702.
The Associated Press began publishing a nearly identical form a year after the plaintiff’s
first distribution. Id. The district court concluded, in part, that the limited space available
in the newspaper for displaying pitching forms so limited the possible variations of the
statistics that the idea of the form had merged with its expression and, thus, the plaintiff’s
form did not warrant copyright protection. Id. at 703. On appeal, the court reversed and
remanded the ruling of the district court. Id. at 711.
96
Id. at 705 (citing Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 916 (2d Cir.
1980)).
97
630 F.2d 905, 916 (2d Cir. 1980). In Durham, the court found that the two
expressions in question were dissimilar; therefore, merger was not at issue. Id. at 918.
98
Kregos, 937 F.2d at 715. (Sweet, J., dissenting). Judge Sweet argued that a proper
merger analysis requires the court to decide whether the copyrighted work meets the
requirement of creativity and whether merger exists before allowing copyright protection.
Id. Again, as most circuits applying the doctrine as a bar to copyrightability did, Judge
Sweet interpreted § 102(b) as indicating that copyright protection cannot extend to a
work that is inseparable from the underlying idea. Id. Judge Sweet also noted that the
majority of cases have followed the copyright bar approach. Id.
99
Id. at 715.
100
86 F.3d 320, 323 (2d Cir. 1996). In that case, the plaintiff and the defendant were
creators of mannequins that serve as mounts for animal skins. Id. at 321. The defendant
frequently used mannequins created by other manufacturers including those of the
plaintiff. Id. The plaintiff, therefore, sued the defendant for copyright infringement for
selling duplicates of the plaintiff’s model. Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 322.
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presented can the court apply merger at the copyrightability stage.103
Those cases are all but unlikely.104 Therefore, the court reasoned that the
better approach would be to evaluate the doctrine in the context of
particular infringement in consideration of evidence relating to
substantial similarity so as to have a “‘more detailed and realistic basis’”
for evaluation.105 Certainly, where descriptions of a defendant’s work are
not present, the idea-expression dichotomy is immeasurable. However,
so too would be any substantial similarity analysis. Under such a
rationale, neither prong of the copyright infringement test could be
evaluated.
In Reed-Union Corp. v. Turtle Wax, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
stressed the importance of maintaining the difference between copyright
invalidity and scènes à faire.106 Comparing Shakespeare’s Romeo and
Juliet against Bernstein’s West Side Story and Bellini’s I Capuletti e i
Montecchi, the court explained that the core scenes of Romeo and Juliet,
being in the public domain, could be incorporated into Bernstein’s own
work; however, this act did not equate to placing West Side Story in the
public domain.107 Bernstein could, in fact, obtain a copyright for his own
contributions to the work, which would disallow another from copying
his work but not from using similar scenes.108 Although it appears that
this case completely separates scènes à faire from the issue of
copyrightability, the court recognizes that, where a work is entirely
composed of scènes à faire, albeit a rare instance, the work would not
warrant copyright protection.109 Therefore, scènes à faire can be
determinative of copyrightability.
103

Id.
Id.
105
Id. (quoting Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 705 (2d Cir.1991)).
106
77 F.3d 909, 914 (7th Cir. 1996). In this case, the plaintiff manufactured the
number-one selling car wax, NU FINISH, on the market until the defendant introduced a
competing product, FINISH 2001, which ultimately surpassed plaintiff’s market share.
Id. at 911. The plaintiff sued the defendant for copyright infringement claiming that the
defendant’s “Revolutionary” and “Mission” commercials touting its product were
knockoffs of a similar commercial by a third-party distributing company and that the
main elements of the commercial–“laboratory test results, the revival of a weather-beaten
car, the imperviousness of the polish to many car washes”–were scènes à faire, which did
not fall under the scope of copyright protection. Id. The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant on all claims. Id. The district court gave two reasons
for allowing the defendant to use its two commercials: first, it simply used hackneyed
ideas–“polishing up old cars, washing the polished cars, claiming the support of lab
tests”–and that copyright law does not allow a claim of ownership on rudimentary ideas
or common situations under the scènes à faire doctrine and, second, plaintiff’s own
“Junkyard” commercial was not copyrightable. Id. at 913-14.
107
Id. at 914.
108
Id.
109
Id.
104
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Circuits maintaining that the doctrines have no place in determining
copyrightability overlook the fact that the application of the doctrines on
the infringement prong nonetheless considers the copyrightability of a
work. In Lexmark, the majority criticized the district court by stating:
[i]n refusing to consider whether “external factors such as
compatibility requirements, industry standards, and efficiency”
circumscribed the number of forms that [the computer program at
issue] could take, the district court believed that the ideaexpression divide and accompanying principles of merger and
[scènes à faire] play a role only in the “substantial similarity”
analysis and do not apply when the first prong of the
infringement test (copyrightability) is primarily at issue.110

The majority in Lexmark determined that “[b]oth prongs of the
infringement test . . . consider ‘copyrightability,’ which, at its heart, turns
on the principle that copyright protection extends to expression, not to
ideas.”111 On the substantial similarity prong, the doctrines do not
measure similarity, but rather serve to distinguish the protectable
elements of a work from the unprotectable elements.112
Professor Nimmer, a well-renowned authority on copyright law,113
recognizes the split regarding the doctrines.114 Nimmer states that “[i]t is
not always clear whether the merger doctrine is deemed a bar to
copyright protection itself, rather than simply as a defense to
infringement via substantial similarity.”115 With regard to merger,
Nimmer takes the stance that the better approach is to evaluate the ideaexpression dichotomy in terms of a particular dispute rather than baring
110

Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 537-38 (6th
Cir. 2004).
111
Id. at 538.
112
Id.
113
Professor Nimmer has authored multiple books and treatises spanning more than
three decades and is widely considered by many to be a leading authority on copyright
law. E.g., 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1. This fact is supported by the copious
federal court opinions citing to his treatises as well as common recognition by
practitioners. See e.g., Wrench LLC v. Taco Bell Corp., 256 F.3d 446, 457 (6th Cir.
2001); see also Ann Bartow, The Hegemony of the Copyright Treatise, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
581, 589-92 (2004).
114
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1. Nimmer discusses the split within the section
titled “Negating Substantial Similarity,” which notes the doctrines supporting a
defendant’s challenge to a substantial similarity claim. Id. § 13.03[B] (“Having set forth
above the tests for determining substantial similarity, the question remains how the
defendant may challenge such a legal conclusion. Most obviously, the defendant may
deny that such similarity exists. Alternatively, the defendant may concede that some
matters are similar, but maintain that they concern unprotected elements, or are otherwise
nonactionable.”).
115
Id. § 13.03[B][3].
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certain expressions from copyright protection per se.116 Nimmer
proposed that, under this paradigm, similarity of expression resulting
from the fact that a common idea is capable only of expression in a
stereotyped form will make findings of actionable similarity
impossible.117 Nimmer clarified that this stance does not suggest “‘that,
because original copyrighted features are, or may be described as,
standard or commonplace, they may be freely copied.’”118 Rather,
Nimmer concluded that “permissible copying is limited to ‘that similarity
which necessarily results from the replication of an idea.’”119
As the majority in Lexmark points out, Nimmer does not
wholeheartedly disagree with utilizing merger as determinative of
copyright.120 The opinion states that
[a]s a matter of practice, Nimmer is correct that courts most
commonly discuss the idea-expression dichotomy in considering
whether an original work and a partial copy of that work are
“substantially similar” (as part of prong two of the infringement
test), since the copyrightability of a work as a whole (prong one)
is less frequently contested.121

In fact, in his treatise, Nimmer states only that the better view is the
treatment of the doctrine as a defense.122
Nimmer has also been challenged by the courts. Judge Sweet, in his
dissenting opinion in Kregos v. Associated Press, interpreted Nimmer as
requiring a court to hold that, where merger exists, the two disputed
works are not substantially similar even when they are identical.123 Judge
Sweet called this requirement “a not useful variety of doublespeak.”124
Looking to other circuit and district court decisions, the dissent noted
116
Id. (“It is not always clear whether the merger doctrine is deemed a bar to
copyright protection itself, rather than simply a defense to the charge of infringement via
substantial similarity. . . . [T]he better view construes it as the latter, evaluating the
inseparability of idea and expression in the context of a particular dispute, rather than
attempting to disqualify certain expressions from protection per se.”).
117
Id.
118
Id. (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. Goldberger Doll Mfg. Co., 365 F.3d 133, 136 n.3 (2d
Cir. 2004)).
119
Id.
120
Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 387 F.3d 522, 538 (6th Cir.
2004).
121
Id. at 538. It is noteworthy that Nimmer’s discussion of the doctrines and the
circuit split falls within the section titled “Negating Substantial Similarity,” which
discusses the resources available to a defendant in which they may challenge a substantial
similarity claim. 4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[B].
122
Id. § 13.03[B][3][b].
123
Kregos v. Associated Press, 937 F.2d 700, 715 (2d Cir. 1991) (Sweet, J.,
dissenting).
124
Id.
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that, at the time, a majority of cases followed the method where merger
becomes an issue when the copyrighted work and the alleged infringing
work appear to be similar on the surface.125 The dissent argued that the
Nimmer approach leads to the “erroneous conclusion” that the doctrine is
available only where the alleged infringer has independently created a
work, which coincidentally happens to be similar to the work of the
plaintiff. Judge Sweet reasoned that this approach would imply that
merger is only utilized as a tool to explain the unintentional similarity.126
Therefore, the dissent continued, a defendant who has actually copied a
work is not allowed to rely on the merger doctrine to avoid liability.127
The dissent concluded that this approach finds support not from the
strictures of § 102(b), but from the fundamental principles of copyright
law; an independent creation is never deemed infringement.128
In the previously mentioned cases, the courts show indifference to
transaction and litigation costs. Considering the small players that are
involved in many copyright infringement actions, lack of concern for this
aspect demonstrates an unfairness to defendants who should not be
subjected to long legal battles. This point was suggested in Hart, when
the court stated that “in essence, the merger inquiry asks whether all
[works], no matter how artistic they might be, will necessarily be
‘substantially similar.’ And only if this is so, is there no unique

125
Id. at 715-16 (citing Kern River Gas Transmission Co. v. Coastal Corp., 899 F.2d
1458, 1463 (5th Cir. 1990); Toro Co. v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208, 1212 (8th
Cir.1986); Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971); Matthew Bender & Co. v. Kluwer Law Book Publishers, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 107,
109 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting that work which does not “exceed[ ] the boundaries of
‘idea’ and enter[ ] the realm of ‘expression’” is not protectible); Freedman v. Grolier
Enters., Inc., 179 U.S.P.Q. 476, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“When an idea is so restrictive that
it necessarily requires a particular form of expression, that is, when the idea and its
expression are functionally inseparable, to permit the copyrighting of the expression
would be to grant the copyright owner a monopoly of the idea.”).
126
Id. at 716.
127
Id.
128
Id. The dissent argued that, under the approach that utilizes merger as
determinative of copyrightability, an alleged infringer who has directly copied a work is
absolved if the idea of the plaintiff’s work has merged into the expression. Id. (citing
Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry, 446 F.2d at 742) (“When the ‘idea’ and its ‘expression’ are
thus inseparable, copying the ‘expression’ will not be barred, since protecting the
‘expression’ in such circumstances would confer a monopoly of the ‘idea.’”) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted)). Judge Sweet reasoned that this approach more fully accords
with the language and purpose of § 102(b); it focuses consideration on the definition of
the idea of the work at the outset of an infringement inquiry. Id. Although the dissent
agreed that assessing merger in the context of the alleged infringement would lead to a
more realistic and detailed basis for evaluating a merger claim, Judge Sweet supported
the application of the merger doctrine to the issue of copyrightability rather than the
alleged infringement. Id.
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expression to protect under the copyright laws.”129 This suggestion
implies, not only that merger should be applied as determinative of
copyrightability, but also that the case could be disposed of on motion to
dismiss grounds. This would be the most equitable approach for the court
to take because it would allow the courts, when possible, to dismiss the
case early on, fostering judicial economy and saving litigation costs. As
will be discussed in Part IV.B, the threat of litigation alone has been
abused by copyright owners, which has dampened the constitutional goal
of the creative progress. Thus, courts should consider the doctrines from
the outset.
Application of the doctrines as defenses to copyrightability do not
consider the provisions set out in § 102(b). In addition, litigation and
transaction costs are not considered under this approach. It is also
important to note that the cases analyzed in this section are quite
different from DMCA liability cases. As will be discussed in the next
section, the DMCA creates a possibility of liability for the circumvention
of a technological protection measure regardless of whether the actual
use of the copyrighted work infringes and despite claims of fair use or
other exceptions generally recognized under copyright law.130
Considering the harsh liability of the DMCA, courts should be more
reluctant to find copyrightability. To fully understand this critical issue, a
brief outline of the DMCA and its impact on copyright law is necessary.
IV. ANALYZING THE SPLIT IN RESPONSE TO THE DMCA AND THE RISE
IN FALSE POSITIVES
This section provides a history of the events leading to the
enactment of the groundbreaking Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”), which has caused significant controversy in the legal
community due to the dramatic expansion of rights it has bestowed upon
copyright owners, particularly, “the right to control access to copyrighted
works.”131 The DMCA creates this right for owners, who utilize
technology as a means of safeguarding their copyrighted works, by
specifically proscribing the circumvention or the attempt of
129

Hart v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 86 F.3d 320, 322 (2d Cir. 1996).
LEE A. HOLLAAR, LEGAL PROTECTION OF DIGITAL INFORMATION 135, 209 (BNA
Books 2002); see Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1195 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (“Defendants who use such devices may be subject to liability under §
1201(a)(1) whether they infringe or not.”). The DMCA explicitly carves out the exclusive
list of safe harbor provisions that may be asserted as a defense to DMCA liability. 17
U.S.C. § 1201 (d)–(j) (2006).
131
Jane C. Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The Development
of an Access Right in U.S. Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 113, 118
(2003).
130
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circumvention of measures that are set in place to protect digital
works.132 This section demonstrates that the central defense to DMCA
liability is the absence of a copyrightable work. This section uses these
considerations as the foundation for promoting application of the
doctrines as bars to copyrightability to narrow the DMCA’s reach in light
of the harsh proscriptions of the statute.
A. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
1. Brief Historical Background of Copyright and the Birth of the
“Paracopyright”
In today’s world, the rights afforded to a copyright owner have
been dramatically expanded and have become more complex. United
States copyright law originally stemmed from the proposition that the
free copying of an author’s “intangible products of the mind” would
produce negative consequences.133 The Constitution expressly gives
Congress the power to protect original works of authorship “to promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries.”134 However, the tone of copyright law has evolved
through the centuries to, at first, provide greater protection to the author
and for longer periods of time; later, to codify strict limitations on
copyright protection such as fair use; and today, with the enactment of
the DMCA, to create highly controversial “paracopyright” protections.
In 1790, Congress enacted the first federal copyright act, which
attempted to clarify and expand upon those open issues by granting
ownership protection for two fourteen-year terms for the exploitation of
“maps, charts and books.”135 In 1909, Congress completely revisited and
revamped federal copyright laws.136 The Copyright Act of 1909
expanded the subject matter of copyrightable works to all of the author’s
132

Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); see United States v.
Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“Due to the ease with which
digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously,
copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet
without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy.”).
133
Abrahamson, supra note 9.
134
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
135
Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, repealed by Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch.
320, § 23, 35 Stat. 2075, 1080-81; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003); BurrowGiles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 56-57 (1884); see JOYCE, supra note 14,
at 20.
136
JOYCE, supra note 14, at 21 (noting that President Theodore Roosevelt called for “a
complete revision of the copyright law to meet modern conditions” a full four years
before the 1909 Act was finalized).
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writings and allowed this ownership protection to last for two 28-year
terms with the first term commencing at the time of publication.137
Several legislative amendments were made to the 1909 Act to keep pace
with evolving technologies.138
Eventually, Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 1976 (“1976
Act” or “Copyright Act”), which dramatically altered the legal
understanding of what subject matter qualifies for copyright protection
and when it qualifies for copyright protection. The 1976 Act significantly
expands the rights of copyright owners. The 1976 Act also widens the
umbrella of copyrightable works to cover literary works; musical works;
dramatic works; pantomimes and choreographic works; graphic,
pictorial, and sculptural works; motion pictures and audiovisual works;
architectural works; and sound recordings.139 Equally important, the
author no longer has to wait for the publication of his work to enjoy
copyright protection; the 1976 Act allows for protection the moment a
product of the mind becomes fixed in a tangible form.140 The length of
ownership protection was also greatly expanded to endure the length of
the author’s life term plus fifty years.141 Of premier importance, the
exclusive rights for the owner of the copyright are explicitly carved out.
These rights include the right to reproduce and adapt the work, the right
to perform the work, the right to publicly display the work, and the right
to distribute the work.142
Prior to the digital age, the right to distribute was relatively
unthreatened as copyright infringement from an economic harm
standpoint was largely dependent on the cost of carrying out a particular
infringement.143 In that era, a large number of infringing copies and an
expansive distribution network was required to have a substantial effect

137
Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, §§ 23-24, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080-81, repealed by Act of
October 19, 1976, ch. 3, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-73; Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194; see
JOYCE, supra note 14, at 21.
138
See Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140 § 1(b), 85 Stat. 391, 391 (adding
sound recordings as copyrightable subject matter); Act of July 31, 1939, ch. 396, § 2, 53
Stat. 1142, 1142 (adding commercial labels and prints as copyrightable subject matter);
Act of Aug. 24, 1912, ch. 356, 37 Stat. 488, 488 (adding motion pictures as copyrightable
subject matter).
139
17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). This section of the Act still remains unchanged.
140
Id. It is important to note that a copyright infringement suit cannot be instituted
unless the copyright has been preregistered or registered. 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) (2006).
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Act of October 19, 1976, ch. 3, § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572-73 (current version at
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the author plus seventy years. Sony Bono Copyright Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
§ 102(b), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 (1998).
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17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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HOLLAAR, supra note 130, at 135.

326

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 3:303

on the market.144 Therefore, the exclusive right to distribute the work was
relatively unchallenged. In the digital era, however, unlimited copies can
be made, with little to no variation in quality from the original, and
distributed all over the world at the touch of a button; the copyright
holder may suffer millions of dollars in damages while the cost to the
infringer literally disappears.145 Whereas before, “[a] few hand-made
copies of a book would have little effect on the worldwide sale of a
printed book,”146 today “an individual consumer may become a
worldwide distributor of copyrighted material after obtaining a single,
promotional copy in digital format.”147
In the early 1980s, with copyright law inadequately protecting the
behemoth entertainment industries from the realities of the digital age,
technological measures were adopted, such as the invention of
Macrovision by the motion picture industry, to thwart unauthorized
copying of videocassettes containing copyright protected motion
pictures.148 Satellite television joined the fray by encrypting its
broadcasts to prevent unauthorized reception by viewers, who had not
subscribed for its service.149 Congress responded to and aided the
satellite television industry by enacting the Satellite Home Viewer Act.150
The computer software industry also came on board with its own
copyright protection measures, which were fiercely opposed by the
public.151 Eventually, Congress enacted the Audio Home Recording Act
of 1992 in response to the digital audio tape (“DAT”) recording format, a
technological feat at the time, which allowed unauthorized persons to
make “perfect” copies of recorded music.152
Despite the efforts of Congress and the industries’ technological
protections, copyright owners continued to fear that these measures were
insufficient without a legal impediment designed to punish devices or
services that circumvented the technological protections.153 This
inescapable fact led the entertainment and computer industries to
Congress’s doorstep again seeking modern-era protection of their
144

Id.
Id. (citing United States v. LaMacchia, 871 F. Supp. 535, 536 (D. Mass. 1994)).
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Id.
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A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d 896, 909 n.12 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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COHEN, supra note 10, at 575.
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Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3949 (1988) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
119 (2006)).
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COHEN, supra note 10, at 576.
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Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§
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Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 113 (noting several anti-circumvention claims that
suggest that these concerns are warranted).
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intellectual property interests. As a response to industry outcry and, in an
attempt to gauge the effects the Internet would have on copyright
infringement, a task force appointed by the Clinton Administration in
1995 issued a “White Paper” analyzing whether existing intellectual
property laws were sufficiently adapted to the new digital age.154 The
White Paper issued proposals that would affect, among other things,
dealings with the circumvention of technological protection on digital
devices.155 Despite their valiant effort, the proposals set forth in the
White Paper were ultimately rejected due to stiff resistance by Internet
service providers as well as other outstanding problems that were left
unaddressed.156 Meanwhile, the implementation of further methods of
innovative electronic copyright protection continued.157 However, as the
encryption methods increased, the availability of methods with which to
bypass that protection also increased.158 The continued inadequacy of
copyright law spurred Congress to act yet again. Their response was the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”).
The DMCA grants additional legal protection to copyright owners
who utilize technology as a means to safeguard their works.159 The
primary purpose of the statute reflects content owner demands by
specifically proscribing the circumvention of measures that were set in
place to protect digital works.160 The statute targets both devices that are
primarily designed to circumvent these protection measures and devices
that have only a limited commercially significant purpose other than the
circumvention of these protection measures.161 So determined was
Congress in its protection goals that only in the midst of bitter
controversy between the industries and the public did they carve out a
few, discreet exceptions to the general rule of blanket anti-circumvention
154

HOLLARR, supra note 130, at 202.
Id.
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Id. at 154.
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Jeffrey A. Bloom et al., Copy Protection for DVD Video, 87 PROC. IEEE 1267,
1268 (1999) (noting the creation in 1996 of the Content Scrambling System (“CSS”), the
Analog Protection System (“APS”) and the Copy Generation Management System
(“CGMS”) by the Copy Protection Technical Working Group).
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See, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294
(S.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that the defendant had successfully created a decryption code
(DeCSS) that bypassed CSS technology).
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COHEN, supra note 10, at 578.
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006); see United States v.
Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1140 (N.D. Cal. 2002) (“‘Due to the ease with which
digital works can be copied and distributed worldwide virtually instantaneously,
copyright owners will hesitate to make their works readily available on the Internet
without reasonable assurance that they will be protected against massive piracy.’”
(quoting S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 8 (1998)).
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legislation: reverse engineering to achieve interoperability of software;
the development of circumvention tools and circumvention for good faith
encryption research; circumvention of access controls in the Internet
context to enable filtering; circumvention of access controls to prevent
the collection of personal on-line activity information; and the
development of circumvention tools and circumvention for testing the
security of computer systems.162
These anti-circumvention proscriptions have created a new right
under copyright law: “the right to control access to copyrighted
works,”163 or “paracopyright.”164 This statute tipped the copyright power
balance heavily in favor of the copyright owner and met with little
enthusiasm in the legal world. Some legal theorists argued that the law
should suppress technology by disallowing the creation and proliferation
of anti-circumvention devices.165 Others objected to the increase in
power bestowed upon the copyright owners by the grant of this access
right and the shift in the balance between the copyright owner and rights
of the user that ensued.166
The proscriptions of the DMCA are severe and they have drawn
much criticism, particularly due to the gross misuse of copyright
protection that the statute allows. Not only is the circumvention of
technology protection measures considered illegal under the DMCA, but
trafficking in circumventing technology is also proscribed, even to the
extent that the public release of information regarding ways to

162

Id. § 1201(d)-(g).
Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 118.
164
The court in United States v. Elcom stated that
as reflected in the legislative history of the DMCA, Congress recognized
that while the purpose of the DMCA was to protect intellectual property
rights, the means of doing so involved a dramatic shift from the regulation
of the use of information to the regulation of the devices by which
information is delivered. For this reason, the legislators viewed the
legislation as “paracopyright” legislation that could be enacted under the
Commerce Clause. Such a step by Congress to protect the market for digital
content as an action under the Commerce Clause cannot be said to override
Constitutional restraints of the Intellectual Property Clause, because
Congress’ fundamental motivation was to protect rights granted under the
Intellectual Property Clause in the digital world. Congress recognized that
traditional intellectual property laws regulating the use of information
border on unenforceable in the digital world; only regulation of the devices
by which information is delivered will successfully save constitutionally
guaranteed intellectual property rights.
203 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (citations omitted).
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Ginsburg, supra note 131, at 118.
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circumvent protection mechanisms is considered trafficking.167 The
severity of the legislation also becomes apparent when one considers that
attempting to circumvent a protected device, whether successful or not,
triggers DMCA liability. Although it would be hard to dispute that access
controls are not important in the digital age, there is much cause for
concern in terms of the protection the DMCA affords the copyright
owner. The provisions of § 1201(a), which protect technological access
control of “a work protected under this title,” do not state “how much of
the work” must be protected.168 Accordingly, it is possible that the
circumvention of a completely public work that is cloaked in a
technological protection measure may trigger DMCA liability so long as
the public work is infused with some copyrightable elements.169 As Jane
Ginsburg eloquently stated, as a practical consequence “[a] copyrightable
figleaf that a producer affixes to an otherwise unprotectable work could,
as a practical matter, obscure the public domain nakedness of the
compiled information, and thereby insulate the [work] from the further
access that is a prerequisite to otherwise lawful copying.”170
Furthermore, protection under the DMCA potentially extends the
life of a copyright far beyond the normal statutory period. For instance,
consider the case of a movie in DVD format, which has been embedded
with digital copy protection.171 The access protection will exist for the
total life of the disc: potentially forever.172 Because the DMCA prohibits
circumventing the copy protection to access the underlying work, it is
possible that the work may be kept from the public domain indefinitely,
thus, “making . . . entry into the public domain merely theoretical.”173
Additionally, technological measures can never account for the
intricacies of the law and, even if they could, no level of sophistication
could enable them to adapt to the ever-changing law. As a consequence,
the DMCA legalizes copyright misuse by creating unlimited term
protection to works that are both protectable and not legitimately
protectable under copyright.174
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However, DMCA liability is not without its limitations. Modern
interpretation of the statute dictates that the underlying work must
contain some copyrightable subject matter. In Chamberlain Group, Inc.
v. Skylink Technologies, Inc.,175 Chamberlain, a manufacturer of a garage
door opener (“GDO”) sued Skylink, a universal remote control
manufacturer, in part, for violation of the DMCA.176 A central issue in
this case was whether the access to the applications was authorized,
which would exonerate the defendant of DMCA liability. More pertinent
to this comment, however, was the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of the
DMCA in terms of its scope of liability. The court made several
important points limiting the reach of the DMCA in anticircumvention
suits. The court pronounced that some reasonable relationship must exist
between the act of circumventing a technological access control and the
copyrighted work.177 The court also noted that holding otherwise would
allow a defendant to effectively create aftermarket monopolies.178
Furthermore, the court felt that § 1201(c)(1), which states that “nothing
in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to
copyright infringement, including fair use, under this title,” would flatly
contradict itself by proscribing unauthorized access without regard to
other provisions of the Copyright Act.179 In consideration of these issues,
the court held that the only meaningful interpretation of the DMCA was
to require a nexus between the access and the protections otherwise
175

381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Chamberlain’s GDO system utilized a copyrighted
computer program called “rolling code” that acted as a security measure by changing the
signal that the transmitter needs to send to the garage door. Id. at 1183. Chamberlain’s
GDO incorporated a rolling code mechanism that created a window of bit strings. Id. at
1184. When a signal is sent from a transmitter that falls within the window it would allow
the opener to activate the motor and open the garage door. Id. If the data sent from the
transmitter fell outside of this window, the GDO would ignore it and the garage door will
stay shut. Id. However, should the user send two signals within quick succession of one
another and the two bit strings sent differ by three, the GDO would enter into a
resynchronization module that would reset the window and allow the transmitter to
operate the garage door. Id.
Skylink’s program did not incorporate the rolling program yet nonetheless was
capable of controlling the GDO. Id. at 1185. Skylink’s transmitter simulated the rolling
code and resynchronization methods by sending signals in rapid succession, two of which
differ by three. Id. This caused the GDO to either immediately accept the incoming signal
or to enter into the resynchronization mode and allow the transmitter to operate the
garage door. Id. Chamberlain claimed that Skylink was liable under the DMCA on the
grounds that the GDO contained copyright protected computer programs and that the
rolling code acted as a technology measure that operated to control access to the
programs. Id.
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Id. at 1182.
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Id. at 1200.
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Id. at 1201.
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Id. at 1200 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(1) (2006)).

2006]

Pruning Paracopyright Protections

331

afforded to copyright owners under the Copyright Act.180 Any other
interpretation would grant “copyright owners carte blanche authority to
preclude all use.”181 The court rested its decision on the fact that
Chamberlain did not demonstrate a protected property right upon which
Skylink infringed. Accordingly, should no copyright exist in the accessed
work, no DMCA liability could ensue.
2. Utilizing the Copyrightability Approach as a Response to the
DMCA
Under the DMCA, the work itself must be copyrightable in order to
trigger DMCA liability. The single, unwavering escape from DMCA
liability outside of the statutory safe harbor provisions is a finding that
the underlying work does not warrant copyright protection. Thus, in
consideration of the harsh effects of this controversial legislation, courts
should apply the merger and scènes à faire doctrines as bars to
copyrightability as opposed to defenses to infringement in DMCA cases.
Under any other approach, the court would be forced to presume that
DMCA liability has been triggered and undergo a liability analysis under
that statute. This notion was considered in Lexmark International, Inc. v.
Static Control Components, Inc.:182 the single case to date that involved
DMCA concurrently with merger/scènes à faire issues.
In that case, Lexmark, a printer manufacturer, sued Static Control
Components (“SCC”), a printer remanufacturer, for copyright
infringement in an effort to enjoin SCC from selling microchips that
allowed competing printer cartridges to operate with Lexmark’s
printers.183 Two programs at issue were the Toner Loading Program
(“TLP”) and the Printer Engine Program (“PEP”); Lexmark owned
copyrights for both the TLP and PEP programs and both programs could
be read directly from the device on which they were stored.184 The TLP
was responsible for measuring amounts of toner remaining in the
cartridges.185 It was a very small program, less than 55 bytes depending
on the printer model, consisting of only eight program commands which
converted torque readings (using mathematical functions) to printer
levels.186 The PEP controlled the functions of each printer, such as paper
feeding and movement, and was larger than the TLP yet still relatively
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id. at 1202.
Id. at 1203.
387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 528.
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small.187 Lexmark sold the cartridges on a prebate and non-prebate
basis.188 The prebate cartridges were sold at an up-front discount under
the agreement that the cartridge would be used only once and then would
be returned to Lexmark.189 To ensure adherence to this agreement, a
publicly available encryption algorithm was employed to calculate a
Message Authentication Code (“MAC”) which operated as a handshake
between the printer and the printer cartridge.190 The program compared
the code calculated by the microchip against the code calculated by the
printer; it terminated operation if the match was unsuccessful (only
cartridges authorized by Lexmark would produce a match).191 After the
authentication sequence was completed a second calculation was
performed in which the PEP downloaded a copy of the TLP.192 A
commonly used check-sum authentication sequence calculated the bytes
of information in the code and compared it to a preset number which, if
the numbers did not match, the Lexmark printer assumed the TLP was
corrupted and would cease to operate.193
SCC manufactured its “SMARTEK” microchips, which could
break the Lexmark’s authentication sequence code.194 The chip could be
installed on any competing printer cartridge in order to trick a Lexmark
printer into thinking it was communicating with an authorized Lexmark
printer cartridge.195 The chip contained an exact copy of the Lexmark
TLP program.196 Lexmark brought suit against SCC for copyright
infringement of the TLP as well as for circumvention of the TLP and
PEP in violation of the DMCA.197 On the DMCA count, Lexmark
contended that the SMARTEX chip circumvented the authentication
sequence, which Lexmark claimed was a technological access control
measure that protected the TLP.198
The district court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of
Lexmark.199 The Sixth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and
rejected the DMCA claims.200 According to the court, the two programs
187
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were not protected by any control mechanism, since they were readily
available in the printer memory.201 As such, the purchase of the printer
automatically authorized access to the two programs and no DMCA
violation could ensue.202
Although the majority opinion did not mention the circuit split,
Judge Feikens, in his dissenting opinion, raised the issue concerning
whether the merger and scènes à faire doctrines act as an outright bar to
copyrightability or if they only act as a defense to certain types of
infringement.203 Taking each in turn, the dissent introduced his concern
as to the relevancy of either approach.204 First, Judge Feikens stated that,
if the doctrine was applied at the copyright stage and the court found that
merger occurred, the plaintiff would lose his opportunity to assert any
claim for relief under the DMCA, which applies only to works that are
protected under copyright law.205 On the other hand, the dissent noted
that, if the doctrine was applied at the infringement stage, the court must
consider a DMCA analysis despite having found that merger occurred.206
Accordingly, the dissent felt that it was essential to determine which
approach to take before entering the DMCA analysis.207
As a general rule, in cases involving merger with a method of
operation, Judge Feikens suggested that the doctrine apply at the
infringement stage of the analysis and “ha[ve] no bearing on the question
of copyrightability” of the work.208 Judge Feikens explained that the
Copyright Act precludes copyright protection of methods of operation.209
However, the dissent noted that a text that is otherwise copyrightable
“can be used as a method of operation of a computer” using the example
of a poem used as a password or, in this case, a computer program used
as a lock-out code.210 Judge Feikens reasoned that it was important to
know how the alleged infringer used the material in order to determine
whether merger occurred.211
201
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Judge Feikens’s explanation of why the merger doctrine should be
addressed in the infringement prong did not extend only to the merger of
an expression with a method of operation; it applied to all cases.212 The
dissent stressed that the use of the work should be viewed separately
from the issue of copyrightability. However, the dissent’s very thorough
explanation failed to answer why merger could not be considered with
the question of copyrightability. In fact, Judge Feikens notably pointed
out that the application of the doctrine to copyrightability could be
determinative in subjecting a defendant to DMCA liability. Additionally,
with regard to scènes à faire, Judge Feikens stated that, where possible,
scènes à faire should come into play in determining the question of
copyrightability.213 Moreover, the DMCA creates a possibility of liability
for the circumvention of a technological protection measure regardless
of whether the actual use of the copyrighted work infringes, and in spite
of fair use or other exceptions generally recognized under copyright
law.214 The anticircumvention proscriptions are independent of the
copyright claim. It must logically follow that application of the merger
and scènes à faire doctrines as defenses are similarly unhelpful in
escaping the harsh DMCA liability based on the simple fact that the
statute has already been triggered. Therefore, limiting application of the
doctrines solely to the infringement defense prong deprives the defendant
of a valid safe harbor from DMCA liability, because she was unable to
argue the existence of an invalid copyright under the bar to
copyrightability approach. To ensure the loss of this defense, Congress
did not pass a proposed amendment to revise the DMCA, which would
benefit of the defense. Id. With regard to the doctrine of scènes à faire, Judge Feikens
noted the circuit split regarding whether the doctrine is “separate from the doctrine
regarding the validity of a copyright” or if the doctrine “determined whether substantial
similarity existed.” Id. at 559. The dissent advocated a distinction in the area of
computer programming, since that area goes beyond literary stock scenes to contain
elements dictated by external constraints. Id. Again, the dissent maintained that some
inquiry into the use of the element must take place. Id. However, Judge Feikens stated
that, where possible, scènes à faire should come into play in determining the question of
copyrightability as was held in Stromback v. New Line Cinema, an earlier Sixth Circuit
ruling. Id.
212
Id. at 557 (Feikens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Although I
would exercise judicial economy and limit the holding to the case of merger with a
method of operation . . . I would find the merger doctrine can operate only as a defense to
infringement in that context, and as such has no bearing on the question of
copyrightability.”).
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Id. at 559.
214
HOLLARR, supra note 130, at 208-209; see Chamberlain Group v. Skylink Techs.,
Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1195 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Defendants who use such devices may be
subject to liability under § 1201(a)(1) whether they infringe or not”). The DMCA
explicitly carves out the exclusive list of safe harbor provisions, which may be asserted as
a defense to DMCA liability. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (d)–(j) (2006).
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impose liability only when the access-control circumvention led to actual
copyright infringement.215 This legislative action further emphasizes the
notion that applying the doctrines in the context of copyright
infringement defense is not helpful. Should the day come when this
amendment is passed, reconsideration of this split in DMCA cases may
be appropriate. That day is not today.
B. The Issue of False Positives
The rising cost of false positives also supports the application of the
doctrines as bars to copyrightability. In the copyright context, a false
positive occurs when copyright protection is improperly attributed to a
work that does not warrant protection.216 False positives directly affect
error costs: the costs attributed to erroneous outcomes in intellectual
property cases.217 The error costs depend on the frequency of generating
a false positive and the social cost created by the false positive.218 An
increase in either or both of these two factors leads to an increase in the
error cost. The issue of false positives directly affects the balance
between copyright ownership rights and creative expression: too much
copyright protection may create a dampening effect on later creative
efforts by bestowing a windfall upon the plaintiff in an infringement
suit.219
A legal rule may have the effect of increasing or decreasing the
frequency of a false positive220 and an error can occur when the law is
applied to the facts of a case incorrectly.221 Disallowing application of
merger at the copyrightability stage would lead to an increase in the
frequency of false positives. Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act
specifically forbids a grant of copyright protection to an idea.222 The
merger doctrine is rooted in this ideal by demanding that, where an idea
is capable of expression in only few ways, the expression and the idea
merge; thus, no copyright protection may be granted as dictated by §
102(b). Similarly, scènes à faire follows the same ideal by stating that
stock scenes do not qualify as expression but are closer to the idea. Thus,
215
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216
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keeping this doctrine outside of the question of copyrightability allows
works, where the expression and the idea merge, to incorrectly obtain
copyright protection, which increases the frequency of false positives and
error costs.
Generally, a false positive in the copyright context creates a social
cost by keeping a creative work out of the public domain. This cost is
balanced by the goal of copyright law to create incentives for artists to
contribute creative works to the world. During the term of copyright, the
copyright owner may benefit from his bundle of rights by disallowing
copies or derivative works absent payment of licensing fees or some
other contractual arrangement. However, the constitutional intent is to
grant this privilege for only a limited time. This balance shifts to unfairly
benefit the copyright owner in DMCA-era paracopyright law. The false
grant of a copyright places the work under DMCA jurisdiction when the
work is guarded by a technological protection measure to prevent access.
Once this measure has been taken, a work may indefinitely be kept out of
the public domain, lest a person be willing to circumvent the protection
measure and face DMCA liability. This potential reality stands in stark
contrast to the “securing [copyright] for limited [t]ime[]” constitutional
language.223 While this shift may be favorable to the copyright owner
who may reap the benefit of this monopoly, society suffers by incurring
costs to access the work or to create derivatives thereof.
Falsely granting an unwarranted copyright allows the owner to get
away with legal murder by reaping the benefits of the monopoly while
unfairly creating the social costs of barring access to the work.224 The
copyright owner is free to charge others with DMCA liability as well as
copyright infringement, which results in unnecessary litigation costs for
defendants as well as undue burdens for the courts. Administrative
efficiency suffers due to a backlog of copyright infringement and DMCA
cases on a court docket that should not be there in the first place. By not
applying merger and scènes à faire at the copyrightability stage, there is
even more danger in wrongfully protecting the “expression” by way of a
false positive. Whereas a false positive grants protection where it should
not be allowed, in this case, a false positive would improperly grant
protection to the idea or the stock scene, because that safeguard is
removed when the doctrines are not considered at the copyrightability
stage. Therefore, the allowance of a false positive stands in stark contrast
223

U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
For a more detailed analysis of the social costs created by copyright protection, see
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2004).
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with § 102(b) proscription of granting copyright protection to an idea.
Where ideas become legally protected, the intent of promoting the
progress of the useful arts is lost.
V. CONCLUSION
Applying the merger and scènes à faire doctrines as bars to
copyrightability will support both the § 102(b) idea-expression
dichotomy, which declares that ideas are not copyrightable subject matter
due to the harmful monopoly effects it would otherwise create as well as
the constitutional goal of fostering creative expression by rendering ideas
free to the world. Since the enactment of the DMCA, the flaws of the
statute have continued to reveal themselves. Paracopyright protection
forms a dark cloud over copyright law with terrible repercussions to
society despite the benefits to the copyright owners. By applying the
merger and scènes à faire doctrines to the issue of copyrightability,
defendants are deprived of a valid escape mechanism from harsh DMCA
liability. Finally, the danger of false positives in the copyright context
sends a harbinger for the courts to consider the doctrines as a bar to
copyrightability rather than as a defense to particular types of
infringement.

